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38. Muslim Travellers: Homing Desire, the Ummah and British-Pakistanis 
Seán McLoughlin 
 
The 15 million people of Muslim descent now settled in Western Europe represent the most 
significant movement of labour into the continent since the Second World War (Cesari and 
McLoughlin 2005). This essay explores the salience of an Islamic ‘homing desire’ for 
contemporary Muslim diasporas. It focuses on the idea of belonging to the ummah, a 
synchronic and diachronic community of believers which claims membership of around one 
billion believers across over 50 nations world-wide. The ummah can be said to have a clear 
mytho-historical and territorial orientation in terms of Makkah, the birthplace of Islam and its 
Prophet, as well as remaining the focus of a return there during the greater and lesser 
pilgrimages, the hajj and ‘umra (McLoughlin 2009). However, the emphasis here is on more 
de-territorial and extra-territorial, trans-local and supra-local imaginings. I begin by exploring 
how and why universal religions might create a homeland consciousness analogous to that of 
a diaspora, continue by sketching what this has meant in terms of the history of Islam as a 
travelling faith, and conclude by examining the extent to which global crises involving 
Muslims and the Islamic world since the 1990s have revealed what Werbner (2002b) calls the 
predicament of diaspora amongst British-Pakistanis. 
 
Diaspora consciousness, homing desires and religious identity 
In a highly globalized society, time and space are compressed with such increasing intensity 
and extensity that the experience of simultaneity across distance is becoming possible in 
some aspects of transnational life. However, even amidst the flows of people, capital, goods, 
information and ideas, social relations beyond the local remain imagined, indeed ever more 
intensely so. Because of advances in communications technology, diasporas no longer 
struggle as they once did to maintain contact with their homelands and co-ethnics dispersed 
world-wide. Nevertheless, absence, loss and the fallibility of memory continue to produce 
fictions of home and community which, while being ‘imaginatively true’ inevitably remain 
partial and fragmented representations (Rushdie 1991: 10). For this reason post-modern and 
post-colonial re-appropriations of diaspora theory have problematized a preoccupation with 
homeland origins. At the same time, such a preoccupation lends legitimacy to hostland 
formulations of belonging that construct racialized and ethnicized minorities as ‘in’ but not 
‘of’ the nation. Instead, theorists like Hall, Gilroy and Bhabha valorize interstitial spaces 
between ‘here’ and ‘there’ as sites for imaginative counter-narratives which resist, 
reconfigure and translate home and hostland traditions anew, mapping new cartographies of 
identification which the conventional diasporic triad (cf. Sheffer 1986b; Safran 1991) cannot 
necessarily contain. This, then, is the context for scholars’ consideration of more 
deterritorialized and metaphorical imaginings of belonging beyond place and the nation-state, 
for example in terms of Brah’s emphasis on ‘a homing desire which is not the same thing as a 
desire for a ‘homeland’’ (1996: 179-80; cf. Clifford 1997). 
 
In this regard, Cohen’s original typology (1997: x) speaks of cultural diasporas – more 
recently and usefully re-dubbed deterritorialized diasporas (Cohen 2008: 18). Some 
Caribbean peoples, for example, are said to ‘have lost their conventional territorial reference 
points … [they] have become in effect mobile and multi-located’ (2008: 124). Other 
examples of such atypical diasporas include the religious diaspora of Muslims, the main 
focus of this essay. However, the question of whether a particular religious tradition or 
religions in general can properly, or usefully, be described in terms of the concept of diaspora 
is disputed. Vertovec, for example, draws a distinction between ‘ethnic’ religions such as 
Judaism, Sikhism and Hinduism which seem to qualify, and ‘universal’ religions such as 
Christianity, Islam and Buddhism about which he is more sceptical. Historically, the latter 
have been less obviously tied to particular peoples or places: ‘It broadens the term far too 
much to talk – as many scholars do – about the “Muslim diaspora”, “Catholic diaspora”...and 
so forth...[A]re Muslims in Pakistan part of a diaspora religion because Islam is derived from 
and broadly centred on Mecca?’ (2004b: 281). However, for all the slipperiness of religion as 
a category in this regard, Cohen does seem to acknowledge that such issues are worthy of 
further exploration:  
[R]eligions can provide additional cement to bind a diasporic consciousness, but they do not 
constitute diasporas in and of themselves… The myth and idealization of a homeland and a 
return movement are also conspicuously absent…their programmes are extraterritorial rather 
than territorial…On the other hand, once we admit the category of a cultural diaspora, we are 
also opening out the possibility that spiritual affinity may generate a bond analogous to that 
of a diaspora. (1997: 189)  
 
The suggestion here is that while in different time/space combinations religions indigenize 
and often reinforce territorial identifications, it is the ability to trump such processes with 
extraterritorial imaginings that is both especially salient and peculiarly well enabled in a 
globalizing world. Despite ‘composite origins’ (Stewart and Shaw 1994: 18), the power of 
religions resides in their mythic, symbolic and ritual resources to narrate the idealized fictions 
and abstracted unities which seek to emphasize stability over flux and secure continuity 
through time and across space. Portable sacred texts, competitive missionary aspirations and 
the activities of translocal orders, all point towards religion as the original globalizer 
(Lehmann 2001). However, as Turner notes, in the past, ‘world religious systems had little 
opportunity to realize themselves globally’ (1994: 83). Thus some key transformations 
associated with modernity including advances in communications technology have facilitated 
universalizing discourses seeking to better assert themselves. Rather than assimilate or 
liberalize, even traditions characterized as essentially resistive of singular definitions such as 
‘Hindu-ism’ have tended to emphasize ‘universalizing’ religious tendencies in a pluralizing 
world (cf. Smart 1987; McLoughlin 2010). Indeed, self-conscious of difference – provoked 
by interactions with others, both with the state, wider society and a broader range of co-
religionists – diasporas are notable for producing increasingly rationalized and homogenizing 
accounts of their traditions. 
 
While transnational flows relativize identifications everywhere, such processes are 
experienced especially intensely in diaspora. Jet-setting intellectuals and artistic elites often 
playfully celebrate a sense of homelessness in this regard but cultural difference and 
intermixture is experienced by many migrants in terms of crisis, alienation and doubt 
(Werbner 1997a: 12). Moreover, while multiple identities are a given, a politics that seriously 
challenges the inequalities and exclusions of the world’s global cities has not emerged from 
the endless shifts of hybridity. We must all speak from somewhere and being heard requires 
an act of prioritisation and ‘re-presenting’ oneself (Werbner 1997b: 228). For many migrants, 
then, it is in a selective return to aspects of cultural tradition that many have re-discovered the 
moral resources to restore certainties in the face of cultural translation and social exclusion 
(Hall 1991b: 52–3; Werbner 1997a: 21). 
 
As homeland attachment, custom and language lose their valency when memories fracture, 
especially amongst those born in the diaspora, the argument here is that religious alternatives 
open up the possibility for a new, more mobile, ‘homing desire’ (Brah 1996: 179-80). Unlike 
assimilation, maintaining universal religious (as opposed to homeland cultural) boundaries, 
manages the problem of cultural identity without the risk of losing all sense of a ‘chain of 
memory’ (cf. Hervieu-Léger 2000). New ‘routes’ may be imaginatively continuous with 
‘roots’. Of course, recalling Anthony P. Cohen (1985), the symbolic construction of 
community rests upon shared symbols and not unchanging meanings. Therefore, in the 
context of hostland exclusion of racialized and ethnicized minorities, as well as the uneven 
power geometry of West-Rest relations, non-Christian religions are especially well-resourced 
to imagine moral and political orders beyond the secular nation state and, arguably, the 
universal claims of Western modernity itself.  
 
Travelling Islam and the idea of the ummah 
As Eickelman and Piscatori suggest, various forms of travel and associated ‘journeys of the 
mind’ (1990: xii) – including hajj and ziyarah (pilgrimage to the tombs of holy people), as 
well as rihla (travel in seeking knowledge) and da’wah (proselytism) – have all contributed 
to the Islamicate religious imagination past and present. Such mobility has ‘inspire[d] 
changes in how Muslims conceive of and experience “Islam”’ (1990: 3) as believers have 
negotiated their similarities and differences in encounters with Muslim ‘others’ at least as 
much as non-Muslim ‘others’. Islam’s own myth of origins enshrines the symbolic 
significance of religiously inspired journeying in the account of early Muslims’ persecution 
as a minority in Makkah and emigration (hijrah) to the oasis of Yathrib (later known as 
Madinat al-Nabi, the City of the Prophet). Marking the very beginning of the Muslim (hijri) 
calendar, 622 CE or 1AH, it imagines a symbolic move from Makkan jahiliyya (ignorance) to 
a new, self-governing, social and political order. The universalizing monotheism hitherto 
associated with the ‘higher’ civilisations of the Byzantines and Sassanids became the vehicle 
for a broader unity amongst politically fragmented and polytheistic tribes. Indeed, having 
received God’s final message from the seal of all his Prophets, Muslims believe their ummah 
(a term associated with both religiously inclusive and exclusive meanings in the sources) to 
be ‘the best community’ (Qur’an: 3.110; 4.41; 16.89 – see Dallal 1995), a new chosen people 
open to all humanity. Nearly 1400 years later, Madinah remains the perfect expression of 
Islamic purity and power for Muslims (Metcalf 1996; Mandaville 2001). 
 
While conquest, trade and imperialism over many centuries eventually saw Islam 
territorialized in myriad places from Morocco in the west to Indonesia in the east, large-scale 
conversions were not at first encouraged amongst the Muslims as they burst out of the 
Arabian peninsula. Islam ceased to be a closed hereditary caste (a diasporic ethnic group?), 
becoming a cosmopolitan civilisation rather than the Arab kingdom of the Umayyads (661-
750) only as it travelled and universalized, a new peace economy based on trade emerging 
under the Abbasids (750-1258). Among the new urban elite was a class of religious scholars 
who confirmed a mature Sunni orthodoxy (Lapidus 2002; Rippin 2005). Indeed, some 
controversial revisionist historians even suggest that Islam’s myth of origins is a product of 
this period. In any case, the emergence of Sunnism is a story of various localized Muslim 
knowledges, from Madinah in Arabia to Kufa in Iraq, being relativized and normatively re-
organized trans-locally in conversation with Muslims elsewhere (cf. Mandaville 2001). 
Notably, it achieved authority without a centralized structure (four schools – madhahib - of 
law being authenticated, although no others emerged after the tenth century). 
 In 1258 Baghdad finally fell to the Mongol invaders (who eventually became Muslim 
themselves), but the political / territorial decentralisation and fragmentation of the Abbasid 
Empire had been evident for some time. Certainly the institution of the Caliph (deputy of God 
/ his Prophet) had lost its significance as a symbol of pan-Islamic political integration. 
Indeed, medieval Islam was marked by a period of world-wide diffusion and pluralisation, 
with Muslims of Persian, Turkic and Central/South/South East Asian origin eventually 
outnumbering Arabs. However, the religious beliefs and legal practices that Muslims shared 
provided ‘a sort of citizenship’ (Dallal 1995: 269) in the homeland(ish) entity of dar al-Islam 
(the abode of Islam). Travelling scholars, Sufis and pilgrims integrated diverse populations 
into shared universes of meaning across tribal, agrarian and urban societies. While 
‘Islamizing the indigenous’ necessarily involves numerous fractures and breaks, and 
orthodoxy’s claims to universality can never be completed, the very career of Islam thus 
reflects the enduring power of its religious imaginary. 
 
Perhaps because it achieved the status of a dominant ideology, Mandaville (2001) argues that 
it is difficult to speak of Muslims’ collective effort to mobilize as a political community from 
its origins in Madinah until the period of globalized modernity. Pan-Islamist activists such as 
the peripatetic Persian, Jamal al-din al-Afghani (d.1897) and those involved in the movement 
to revive the Ottoman Caliphate (disestablished by Mustapha Kemal in 1924) called for the 
ummah to reawaken and unite in a bid to repulse European colonisers from dar al-Islam. 
With greater consciousness of the world as a single place, and their own relativized position 
within it at a time of growing literacy, nationalism and print capitalism, well-established 
patterns of religious revival in Islam became a vehicle for a new sort of identity politics 
amongst Muslim elites. While some adopted strategies of hijrah from and jihad against 
Muslim and non-Muslim ‘Others’ in the dislocated present, more characteristic was the 
general desire to return – more or less imaginatively (ijtihad being the term for effort in 
interpretation) – to a sacred home and ancestors of the past, in the hope of making a better 
future (cf. Asad 1986). Loathe to simply accept the West’s attempts to copyright modernity, 
the emergence of Islamism in its many variants can be viewed as an attempt to narrate a rival 
universality (Sayyid 1997).  
 
British-Pakistanis, diasporic predicaments and Islamic identities 
In the postcolonial period, an identity politics with Islamic revivalism at its centre eventually 
gained new strength in the Muslim world from the 1960s and 1970s onwards. Often 
oppressive, secular nationalist regimes were struggling to deliver development equitably to 
growing, youthful populations with higher expectations and, as the Iranian revolution of 1979 
demonstrated so iconically, Islam(ism) became more central to articulating political 
alternatives. Nascent Muslim diasporas like British-Pakistanis were not at all isolated from 
such processes. With initial support from movements such as Jama’at-i Islami, which had a 
small but well organized following amongst mainly urban origin migrants (often students and 
professionals) in the UK, General Zia ul-Haq (1977-1986) initiated a policy of Islamization in 
their homeland. Moreover, as the recollections of British-Pakistani writer, Ziauddin Sardar 
(2004), begin to document, a network of activist-intellectuals in London were being courted 
by Iran (Kalim Siddiqui’s Muslim Institute) but also Saudi Arabia as the two went head-to-
head for leadership of the putative global ummah.  
 
For demographic reasons, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s that such discourses impacted 
on significant numbers of British-born and educated Pakistanis. Educated segments of this 
generation especially embraced the idea of a universalizing, ‘true’ Islam as a serious strategy 
of self- identification which mapped out clear boundaries for behaviour in the testing context 
of cultural pluralisation (J. Jacobson 1998). They distinguished a faith rediscovered anew 
through personal exploration and participation in study circles from the ethno-cultural and 
highly sectarian homeland oriented Islam of their (often uneducated) parents (Lewis 1994). 
Unlike the rote Islam of the Urdu-speaking mosques, in its new, multi-ethnic and English 
vernacular ‘true’ Islam opened up a more cosmopolitical consciousness and reinvented 
religion as a badge of pride, a tool with which efforts could be made to transcend increasingly 
evident circumstances of local deprivation and racist social exclusion (Modood 1990). Even 
amongst those who were not pious or educated, and were gradually assimilating aspects of 
English working class culture, Islam as identity made a lot of sense. For all their continuing 
pride in being Pakistani, British-born youth do not feel ‘at home’ when they visit Panjab or 
Kashmir (McLoughlin and Kalra 1999). 
 
Grassroots British-Pakistani communities had made the case for the public recognition of 
Islam in an ad hoc, locally agreed fashion as part of multicultural policies since the early 
1980s (Lewis 1994). However, the era of a truly diasporic Muslim identity politics was 
catalysed only during the Rushdie Affair of 1989, events being played out on a national and 
global scale. The perceived attack on Islam with the support and consent of dystopic Western 
powers and other conspirators produced often to be repeated utopian ummatic discourse, 
expressed most obviously in the Ayatollah’s fatwa, calling for unity and self-reliant action 
amongst Muslims as a victimized community. With the mass media relaying news of the 
book, protests and interventions in the debate by religious movements and leaders (Bhatt 
1997), many Pakistanis, British-Muslims and their co-religionists across the globe mobilized 
against The Satanic Verses, temporarily forgetting their ethnic, sectarian and other 
differences.  
 
Indeed, during the last two decades, coverage of political crises involving the occupation of 
Islamic lands and the plight of Muslim minorities world-wide has sustained a consciousness 
of such issues, and the fables that surround them (Werbner 2002b), so consistently that global 
events now represent a key factor in being British-Pakistani. The Gulf and Bosnian wars of 
the early to mid-1990s, as well as the ongoing conflicts in Palestine and Kashmir, and since 
9/11 the so-called ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan and Iraq, have all triggered heartfelt (and 
increasingly publicly performed) conflicts of loyalty and co-responsibility. Most often this 
resulted in peaceful protest or other contributions to an increasingly transnational Muslim 
civil society, for example, in terms of charitable giving (McLoughlin 1996). But, for a small 
number, it meant taking up arms, at first overseas and then at ‘home’ in the hostland as the 
events of 7/7 demonstrate (cf. Begg 2006). For Werbner (2002b) these are typically diasporic 
predicaments. 
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